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Governments owe a duty to their constituents to use public
funds wisely and prudently. For decades, governments have used
sealed competitive bidding procedures to award public
construction projects on the basis of lowest price, which safeguards
the public from procurement fraud, favoritism, imprudence, and
extravagance and ensures that public funds are expended in the
1
wisest, most efficient, and least objectionable manner.
In the spring of 2007, the Minnesota Legislature radically
changed Minnesota’s public-procurement policy by enacting a
“best value” alternative to the familiar “lowest responsible bidder”
2
method of awarding public construction contracts. The best value
model allows public entities to consider factors other than cost
3
when awarding contracts. In doing so, the best value model injects
subjectivity into the decision-making process that could result in
many justifiable challenges to the integrity and validity of best value
4
procurements. Any Minnesota public body that chooses to use the
new best value method needs to be aware of the potential for abuse
that exists within the method. They should implement sufficient
safeguards so that the taxpaying public has confidence the method
does not result in procurement fraud, undue influence, favoritism
in the selection of contractors, or extravagant and improvident
procurements.
This article begins with a history of Minnesota’s public
procurement law and Minnesota’s traditional use of competitive
bidding, and it discusses important Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions and the overarching public policies involved in that
5
system.
The next section reviews the statutory framework
1. See Coller v. City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 387, 26 N.W.2d 835, 841
(1947).
2. See Act of May 25, 2007, H.F. No. 548, ch. 148, art. 3, 2007 Minn. Sess.
Law. Serv. 1690, 1734–44 (West).
3. MINN. STAT. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4a (Supp. 2007).
4. See United Techs. Commc’ns Co. v. Wash. County Bd., 624 F. Supp. 185,
192 (D. Minn. 1985) (stating that “if subjectivity can violate the relevant standard
of review [then] such a violation is reasonably likely . . . .”).
5. See infra Part I.A.
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governing public procurements as it existed prior to the new best
value legislation, and it discusses the careful introduction of agency
discretion in more recent statutes allowing the use of the designbuild and construction management at risk methods of project
6
delivery. The subsequent section describes the key provisions of
the new best value legislation, and it presents a table showing how
7
the new method applies to public procurements. Finally, this
Article analyzes and critiques the new legislation, and it
recommends that amendments be made to increase the likelihood
8
that the best value procurements will truly yield the best value.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT IN MINNESOTA

A. Case Law and Public Policies
As early as 1894, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the
need for controls in public contracting. In Elliot v. City of
9
Minneapolis, the court expressed concern that there was little to
govern the award of public contracts other than “the honesty,
10
discretion, and good judgment” of the public body. The court
observed that the public would be better served if government
bodies were required to award contracts to the lowest responsible
11
bidder and invited state and local legislative bodies to enact such
12
requirements.
Over time, competitive bidding evolved into a strict regime
with little or no room for government bodies to exercise
subjectivity or discretion. As the Minnesota Supreme Court
13
observed in Coller v. City of Saint Paul:
Statutory and city charter provisions requiring competitive
bidding in the letting of public contracts require, as
necessary corollaries, that the public officials whose duty it
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. 59 Minn. 111, 60 N.W. 1081 (1894). Elliot involved the purchase of fuel
oil by the city for its public works. Id. at 112, 60 N.W. at 1082.
10. Id. at 114, 60 N.W. at 1083.
11. “Lowest responsible bidder” is a term of art, defined as “[a] bidder who
has the lowest price conforming to the contract specifications and who is
financially able and competent to complete the work, as shown by the bidder’s
prior performance.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 966 (8th ed. 2004).
12. Elliot, 59 Minn. at 115, 60 N.W. at 1083.
13. 223 Minn. 376, 26 N.W.2d 835 (1947). Coller involved a contract for the
installation of 1070 parking meters. Id. at 377–78, 26 N.W.2d at 837.
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is to let a contract should adopt definite plans and
specifications with respect to the subject matter of the
contract; that the plans and specifications be so framed as
to permit free and open bidding by all interested parties;
that a bid shall constitute a definite offer for the contract
which can be accepted without further negotiations; and
that the only function of the public authority with respect
to bids after they have been received shall be to determine
14
who is the lowest responsible bidder.
This goal, “born of ‘distrust’ of public officers,” was to remove
as much discretion as possible from the public officials because
“discretion is precisely where such abuses as fraud, favoritism,
extravagance, and improvidence in connection with the letting of
15
contracts are prevalent.”
Minnesota courts strictly enforced the competitive bidding
regime. To challenge the award of contract, one did not have to
show actual fraud, or even intent to defraud, but only that the
prescribed procedures had not been followed, thus raising the
16
possibility or opportunity that fraud could have occurred. The
courts never lost sight of the ultimate purpose of competitive
bidding legislation, which is to give the taxpayers “the best bargain
17
for the least money.” Courts approved exceptions to the lowest
responsible bidder method only where necessary to protect the
taxpayers’ funds.
Accordingly, courts permitted government
bodies to accept bids with minor, immaterial irregularities, but they
never permitted consideration or acceptance of bids that were
18
materially non-responsive to the terms of bid solicitation.
14. Id. at 384–85, 26 N.W.2d at 840.
15. Id. at 387–88, 26 N.W.2d at 841.
16. Griswold v. Ramsey County, 242 Minn. 529, 535–36, 65 N.W.2d 647, 652
(1954); see also United Techs. Commc’ns Co. v. Wash. County Bd., 624 F. Supp.
185, 188 (D. Minn. 1985) (“Even the slightest deviations from prescribed form are
viewed with a most jaundiced eye.” (citing Foley Bros. v. Marshall, 266 Minn. 259,
123 N.W.2d 387 (1963))).
17. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 535, 65 N.W.2d at 652; see also Foley Bros., 266 Minn.
at 264, 123 N.W.2d at 391 (“The basic purpose of competitive bidding is to give
the public the benefit of the lowest obtainable price from a responsible
contractor.”).
18. See Carl Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 451 N.W.2d 204, 207
(Minn. 1990) (noting that a bid variance is material if it gives the bidder a
substantial advantage over the other bidders); Tel. Assocs. v. St. Louis County Bd.,
364 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1985) (“A board may waive bid defects if public rights
are not thereby prejudiced.”); Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 265, 123 N.W.2d at 391;
Lovering-Johnson, Inc. v. City of Prior Lake, 588 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997) (“[T]he issue [is] whether a change or modification to the bid is ‘substantial
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Case law in Minnesota is consistent in its disdain for
government contract formed on a substantial or material deviation
19
from the specifications.
On all matters involving the substance of a competitive
bid, such as those that may affect the price, quality or
quantity, or the manner of performance, or other things
that go into the actual determination of the amount of
the bid, there may be no material variation or deviation
20
from the specifications.
Any variance in a bid that gives one bidder a substantial
advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders is a matter of
21
material responsiveness. Construction law commentators similarly
define “bid responsiveness” in this manner:
Public contracts—federal, state, and local—may only be
awarded to contractors who submit bids “responsive” to
the material requirements of the invitation for bids.
Evaluation of bid responsiveness focuses on compliance of
the bid with the mandatory requirements of the invitation
and any governing statutes. . . . A deviation is “material” if
it gives the bidder substantial competitive advantage and
prevents other bidders from competing on an equal
22
footing.
Bids on proposals that are materially non-responsive must be
rejected to ensure that all competitors are given an equal
23
opportunity to win the contract. The Federal Court of Claims has
or material.’”). Variations that affect “price, quality, or quantity, or the manner of
performance, or other things that go into the actual determination of the amount
of the bid” are considered material. Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 263, 123 N.W.2d at
390.
19. United Techs. Commc’ns, 624 F. Supp. at 191.
20. Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 259, 123 N.W.2d at 390.
21. Carl Bolander & Sons Co., 451 N.W.2d at 207.
22. 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 2:74 (2002 & Supp. 2007).
23. Carl Bolander & Sons Co., 451 N.W.2d at 208. Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 263,
123 N.W.2d at 390; Duffy v. Vill. of Princeton, 240 Minn. 9, 12, 60 N.W.2d 27, 29
(1953); Sutton v. City of St. Paul, 234 Minn. 263, 267, 48 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1951);
Coller v. City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 385, 26 N.W.2d 835, 840 (1947);
Lovering-Johnson, Inc. v. City of Prior Lake, 558 N.W.2d 499, 502–03 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997). Case law from federal courts and state courts across the country
similarly recognize an absolute obligation to reject non-responsive bids. See, e.g.,
Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. v. United States, 597 F.2d 1371, 1376 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
Albert Elia Bldg. Co. v. Sioux City, 418 F. Supp. 176, 179 (N.D. Iowa 1976); Lower
Kuskokwim Sch. Dist. v. Found. Servs., Inc., 909 P.2d 1383 (Alaska 1996); D.H.
Williams Constr., Inc. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 345, 350 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2007); Abadie v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd., 916 A.2d 913, 916 (D.C.
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provided the following salient explanation for the rule that
materially non-responsive bids must be rejected.
These principles rest upon and effectuate important
public policies.
“Rejection of irresponsive bids is
necessary if the purposes of formal advertising are to be
attained, that is, to give everyone an equal right to
compete for Government business, to secure fair prices,
and to prevent fraud.” The requirement that a bid be
responsive is designed to avoid unfairness to other
contractors who submitted a sealed bid on the
understanding that they must comply with all of the
specifications and conditions in the invitation for bids,
and who could have made a better proposal if they
imposed conditions upon or variances from the
contractual terms the government had specified. The
rule also avoids placing the contracting officer in the
difficult position of having to balance the more favorable
offer of the deviating bidder against the disadvantages to
the government from the qualifications and conditions
the bidder has added. In short, the requirement of
responsiveness is designed to avoid a method of awarding
government contracts that would be similar to negotiating
agreements but which would lack the safeguards present
24
in either that system or in true competitive bidding.
25
Griswold v. Ramsey County is one of the leading Minnesota
cases on public contracting. In 1952, Ramsey County appropriated
26
$600,000 to build a new county jail. After an initial round of bids,
the county discovered that the construction was going to cost more
27
than that amount. All the bids were rejected and a new round of
28
bidding was initiated.
In the new solicitation document, the
bidders were instructed to submit a basic bid and then a list of cost
reductions for various alternative designs such as elimination of a
tunnel to the courthouse, not finishing the fourth floor, or use of
2007); Am. Combustion, Inc. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm’n, 441 A.2d 660,
671 (D.C. 1982); Bigley v. MSD of Wayne Twp. Sch., 823 N.E.2d 278, 284–85 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004); Irwin R. Evens & Son, Inc. v. Indianapolis Airport Auth., 584
N.E.2d 576, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Smith & Johnson Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep’t
of Transp., 731 N.E.2d 720, 724–25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
24. Toyo Menka Kaisha, 597 F.2d at 1377 (citations omitted).
25. 242 Minn. 529, 65 N.W.2d 647 (1954). Griswold has been cited more than
thirty-five times by subsequent Minnesota appellate courts.
26. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649.
27. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649.
28. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649.
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29

cheaper building materials.
The county reserved the right to
30
accept or reject any of the alternatives for six months. The intent
of this novel contracting scheme was to get as much work done as
possible with the already appropriated money and to defer some
31
The result,
work items until more funds became available.
however, was to make determination of the lowest responsive
bidder at the bid opening impossible because different orders of
bidders were achieved depending on which alternatives were
32
deducted from the basic bid. The court noted that the process
theoretically could have resulted in the contract going to the
33
higher bidder.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that though the
Legislature has the authority to determine how the state, through
its agencies and its various political subdivisions, let contracts, it
remains with the courts to ensure that the legislatively prescribed
procedures are not used in an unreasonable or arbitrary and
34
capricious manner. Any contracting procedure that “emasculates
the safeguards of competitive bidding” is impermissible even if
35
fraud does not occur. In finding that the county’s procurement
method violated competitive bidding law, the court reasoned that:
[a] fundamental purpose of competitive bidding is to
deprive or limit the discretion of contract making officials
in the areas which are susceptible to such abuses as fraud,
favoritism, improvidence, and extravagance.
Any
competitive bidding procedure which defeats this
fundamental purpose, even though it be set forth in the
initial proposal to all bidders, invalidates the construction
contract although subsequent events establish, as in the
36
instant case, that no actual fraud was present.
For the same reason, the court held that no material change
can be made to any bid after the bids have been received and
opened, since to permit such changes would “open the door to
37
fraud and collusion.” As a logical corollary, “no material change
29. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649.
30. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649–50.
31. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 650.
32. Id. at 531–32, 65 N.W.2d at 650.
33. Id. at 537, 65 N.W.2d at 653.
34. Id. at 535, 65 N.W.2d at 651–52.
35. Id. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652.
36. Id. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652.
37. Id. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652. See also Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. v. United
States, 597 F.2d 1371, 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (“Responsiveness is determined by
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in contract terms may be made after the contract has been let to
38
the lowest bidder.” In order to prevent even the “opportunity for
fraud and collusion,” the courts will reject a materially nonresponsive bid even if the item in question may not change the
39
These principles and
determination of the successful bidder.
rules of responsiveness govern public procurements even if public
agencies attempt to reserve the right in their solicitation
40
documents to waive or overlook them. Griswold also observed that
judicial enforcement requires enough transparency in the public
contracting process for the tax-paying public to know if they need
to bring suit to prevent the award of a non-responsive or illegal
41
contract.
Furthermore, the public needs the information to
determine whether a bid was non-responsive in a timely manner, as
injunctive relief ceases to be an effective enforcement mechanism
42
Rather than rely on the “honesty,
once construction starts.
43
discretion, and good judgment” of state officials, the Minnesota
Supreme Court acknowledged in a later case the public’s role in
policing letting of contracts by stating that challenges to public
44
contracting decisions should be encouraged.
reference to the bids when they are opened and not by reference to subsequent
changes in a bid. Allowing a bidder to modify a non-responsive bid when, upon
opening the bids, it appears that the variations will preclude an award, would
permit the very kind of bid manipulation and negotiation that the rule is designed
to prevent.”) (citation omitted).
38. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652.
39. Tel. Assocs., Inc. v. St. Louis County Bd., 364 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn.
1985) (“Public officials, however, have no authority to waive defects which affect or
destroy competitive bidding. . . . Although [the item in question] may seem
minor, in a sharply competitive bidding situation, contract awards are often
determined by slight differences. Therefore, a variance in maintenance costs
might have given one bidder an unfair advantage over the others.”). See also Carl
Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 451 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Minn. 1990)
(holding that a failure to submit a bid with Minority-Owned Business Entities
forms gave one bidder the opportunity to repent its bid and hence obtain a
competitive advantage resulting in rejection of the bid as non-responsive: “Failure
to require strict responsiveness, according to bid documents, would impair the
competitive bidding process.”).
40. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652; accord Lovering-Johnson,
Inc. v. City of Prior Lake, 558 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (“The rule
prohibiting material changes once a bid has been opened applies despite
provisions in the bid instructions that allow the public entity to waive
irregularities.”).
41. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 537–38, 65 N.W.2d at 653.
42. Id. at 538, 65 N.W.2d at 653.
43. Elliot v. City of Minneapolis, 59 Minn. 111, 114, 60 N.W. 1081, 1083
(1894).
44. Tel. Assocs., 364 N.W.2d at 383 (“[P]roper challenges to the bid-letting
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In Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake, the Minnesota
Supreme Court faced an ancestor of today’s best value
procurement.
Elbow Lake solicited bids for the various
components of a new electric power generation and distribution
46
system. It received six bids for power meters and selected the
47
third most expensive option.
An action to enjoin the
48
procurement followed. The court held that when an item cannot
be described by “precise or exact specifications,” the procuring
body has reasonable discretion in determining the lowest
49
responsible bid. The court reasoned that “[v]alue is not always
50
determined by price alone.” The procuring body may consider
factors such as quality, suitability, and adaptability for the intended
use, but the court cautioned that the determination must be
reasonable and based upon “some substantial difference in quality
51
or adaptability.” The court limited its holding by reiterating that
in situations where the items to be procured can be specified, the
52
public body has no discretion and must accept the lowest bid.
Regardless of what procurement method is used, the goal is
clear.
The very purpose of requiring competitive bidding is to
divest the officials having the power to let contracts of
discretion in some respects and to limit its exercise in
others. In the area of discretion is precisely where such
abuses as fraud, favoritism, extravagance, and
improvidence in connection with the letting of contracts
are prevalent. Ordinary legal remedies are inadequate to
correct resulting wrongs. The purposes of requirements
for competitive bidding are to prevent such abuses by
eliminating opportunities for committing them and to
promote honesty, economy, and aboveboard dealing in
53
the letting of public contracts.

process should be encouraged.”).
45. 234 Minn. 419, 49 N.W.2d 197 (1951).
46. Id. at 421, 49 N.W.2d at 199.
47. Id. at 421–22, 49 N.W.2d at 199–200.
48. Id. at 422, 49 N.W.2d at 200.
49. Id. at 424, 49 N.W.2d at 201.
50. Id. at 425, 49 N.W.2d at 201.
51. Id. at 424–25, 49 N.W.2d at 201.
52. Id. at 423, 49 N.W.2d at 201.
53. Coller v. City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 387–88, 26 N.W.2d 835, 841
(1947).
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B. Statutory Framework for Public Contracting before the 2007 Best Value
Legislation
1.

As Generally Applied to Construction Contracts

Before the 2007 best value legislation, most public
construction contracts used the lowest responsible bidder
approach.
Minnesota’s Uniform Municipal Contracting Law
(UMCL) applied to all political subdivisions of the state, such as
54
counties, towns, cities, and school districts. For those entities, the
UMCL required that all contracts exceeding $50,000 be let by
55
sealed bidding.
The statutes giving those public bodies the
authority to enter into contracts then dictated that the contract
56
For state
must be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.
agencies, all building and construction contracts over $50,000 had
57
to use a sealed bid method and then had to be awarded to the
58
lowest responsible bidder.
2.

Best Value in State Procurement other than Construction

For procurement other than building and construction
contracts, the Commissioner of Administration was required to use
procurement methods that were designed to ensure that the state
59
When determining best value,
received a “best value.”
60
consideration of price was both mandatory and primary.
Consideration of other factors, such as environmental factors,
quality, and vendor performance, was permitted, but not
61
required. The solicitation document was required to detail what
62
criteria are to be used to evaluate the bids. Further, if factors
other than price were to be considered, the relative weight of the
54. MINN. STAT. § 471.345 subdiv. 1 (2006).
55. Id. at subdiv. 3.
56. MINN. STAT. § 375.21 subdiv. 1 (2006) (counties); § 365.37 subdiv. 2
(towns); § 412.311 (statutory cites); § 123B.52 subdiv. 1 (school districts).
57. § 16C.26 subdiv. 3.
58. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1.
59. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3. These procurements included goods, services, and
utilities, all of which were relatively small when compared to building and
construction contracts. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3.
60. §§ 16C.02 subdiv. 4, 16C.03 subdiv. 3.
61. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4.
62. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3.
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factors was required to be listed in the solicitation document. For
building and construction contracts, however, the Commissioner of
Administration was required to use a request for bid process, with
64
the contract award going to the lowest responsible bidder.
3.

The Trend Toward More Discretion: MnDOT

As with other state agencies, statute traditionally required
Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) contracts for
construction on trunk highways to be awarded to the lowest
65
responsible bidder.
In 2001, however, the Legislature granted
MnDOT the authority, under carefully regulated conditions, to
circumvent that requirement and to “solicit and award a designbuild contract for a project on the basis of a best value selection
66
The best value approach may only be used on ten
process.”
67
percent of the contracts let by MnDOT in any given year, and only
after a finding that using that approach will serve the public
68
interest. The Commissioner of Transportation has final authority
on the decision to use a best value acquisition on design-build
69
projects and must report annually which contracts use that
70
method.
When MnDOT uses the “best value” method on a design-build
contract, it must follow the so-called “two-step competitive
71
process.” In the first phase, MnDOT appoints a commission of at
least five members, one of whom must be a member of the
63. Id.
64. §§ 16C.25–.28. “Request for bid” is a term of art meaning “a solicitation
in which the terms, conditions, and specifications are described and responses are
not subject to negotiation.” § 16C.02 subdiv. 11. That method can be contrasted
with a “request for proposal,” which is “a solicitation in which it is not
advantageous to set forth all the actual, detailed requirements at the time of
solicitation and responses are negotiated to achieve best value for the state.” Id. at
subdiv. 12.
65. MINN. STAT. § 161.32 subdiv. 1b (2000).
66. MINN. STAT. § 161.3412 subdiv. 1 (2006). In a “design-build contract” the
contractor provides “architectural or engineering and related design services as
well as labor, material, supplies, equipment, and construction services . . . .” MINN.
STAT. § 161.3410 subdiv. 3 (2006). See also Act of July 1, 2001, ch. 8, art. 3, 2001
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 2015 (West).
67. MINN. STAT. § 161.3412 subdiv. 3 (2006).
68. § 161.3414 subdiv. 1. When making the determination, MnDOT must
consider a minimum of ten specific factors, enumerated in section 161.3414
subdivision 2.
69. § 161.3416 subdiv. 2.
70. § 161.3428.
71. § 161.3412 subdiv. 2.
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Minnesota Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, to serve
72
Next, MnDOT prepares a
as a Technical Review Committee.
Request for Qualifications (RFQ), which must include the
minimum qualifications of the bidders, a statement of work, a
schedule, project requirements, the form of a contract to be
awarded, the number of firms to be selected for the short list, the
weighted criteria for selection, a description of the request for
proposal requirements, the maximum allowed time for the project,
MnDOT’s estimated cost of the project, and requirements for
73
resources and experience. After issuing the RFQ, the “selection
74
team” evaluates the responses. If fewer than two firms respond,
75
MnDOT may either reissue the RFQ or cancel the project. If
enough responses are received, between two and five firms are
76
selected to be on the “short list.” These firms proceed to the
77
second phase of the process.
In the second phase, MnDOT issues a Request for Proposals
78
(RFP) to short-listed builders. The RFP must include a statement
of work, a description of the required qualifications, the weighted
selection criteria, copies of the contract that the winning proposer
will be expected to sign, the maximum allowed time for the project,
79
and the estimated cost of design and construction. The bidders
must turn in their proposals in two separately sealed packages: a
80
technical portion and a price portion. The RFP specifies the date,
time, and location for the public opening of the sealed price
81
proposals.
The Technical Review Committee then reviews the technical
82
proposals, rejects any it considers non-responsive, and submits
83
scores for the responsive proposals. At the bid opening, MnDOT
announces the technical scores and then opens the price
72. § 161.3420 subdiv. 2.
73. Id. at subdiv. 3.
74. Id. at subdiv. 4. Interestingly, this subdivision uses the undefined term
“selection team” rather than “Technical Review Committee,” even though the
Technical Review Committee is the administrative body designated to evaluate the
RFQ responses. See id. at subdiv. 2.
75. Id. at subdiv. 4.
76. Id.
77. § 161.3422.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
83. MINN. STAT. § 161.3426 subdiv. 1(a) (2006).
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84

proposals. The winning proposal is calculated by dividing each
85
bidder’s price by its technical score to yield an adjusted score.
MnDOT’s commissioner only has discretion either to reject all the
proposals or award the contract to the responsive proposal with the
86
lowest adjusted score.
MnDOT was the first public agency to receive design-build
authority in the 2001 legislative session, and the new legislation was
a result of industry, agency, and bar collaboration. Obviously, this
new type of system allows public officials more discretion and
judgment in selecting the successful bidder than the traditional
procurement methods, which required that the award be made to
the lowest responsible bidder. All parties involved in drafting this
legislation, however, were very concerned about maintaining the
procedural integrity and transparency of the process given the
inherent subjectivity involved in scoring the proposers’ technical
87
proposals. Accordingly, the new legislation contains important
safeguards and unique provisions.
First, according to the new statute, the assertion of claims on
previous projects by a proposer cannot be used to evaluate or score
88
a bidder’s “past performance” or “experience.” This important
provision protects contractors who assert their legal rights on one
project from being penalized in the evaluation process on a
subsequent design-build project.
Second, the evaluation and award criteria for each phase must
be clearly identified and then weighted or prioritized in terms of
89
importance in the RFQ and RFP. The award must then be made
according to scores obtained from evaluating the proposals
84. Id. at subdiv. 1(b).
85. Id. If time was listed as a selection criterion in the RFP, MnDOT may
adjust the scores by assigning a value per day factor. Id. at subdiv. 1(c). That
factor is multiplied by the contractor’s estimated time to completion, yielding a
dollar amount. Id. That amount is added to the price and then divided by the
technical score. Id. The lowest resultant adjusted score must be selected as the
winner. Id. The statutory language is interesting because it is permissive; MnDOT
is not required to use the time factor, but may if it chooses to do so. The statute
does not describe when or by whom that decision must be made. Likewise, the
statute does not require that the value per day time factor be included in the RFP,
nor does it describe how that factor is to be determined. The statute clearly
differentiates between the selection time factor and other contractual time factors,
like the liquidated damages schedule and incentive clauses. Id.
86. Id. at subdiv. 1(d).
87. Id.
88. § 161.3420 subdiv. 3(10).
89. § 161.3422(2).
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90

according to the weighted criteria. This was intended to prevent
awards from being justified on vague, after-the-fact statements that
the successful proposals somehow represented the “best value” to
the public. Instead, the awards have to be based on scoring criteria
that are established and weighted by MnDOT before proposals are
91
received.
Third, the proposers selected to submit an RFP get a stipend
to help defray the costs of preparing a design for the phase two
92
competition, which can be quite expensive.
This should help
small bidders compete on more equal footing with larger and
better capitalized competitors.
Fourth, the commissioner cannot use design-build
procurement on more than ten percent of all transportation
93
contracts awarded each year. In addition, before using designbuild procurement, the commissioner must satisfy several criteria
intended to gauge whether design-build procurement will best
serve the public interest on the particular project in question and
94
issue a written report justifying use of the method.
These
requirements should help ensure that traditional competitive
bidding for MnDOT projects will not be immediately jettisoned in
favor of design-build procurement and that design-build
procurement will only be used on appropriate projects.
Finally, the statute makes clear that the principle of
responsiveness is to be enforced in evaluating proposals. The
Technical Review Committee reviewing phase two proposals is
expressly instructed that it “shall reject any proposal it deems non95
The statute further declares that “[t]he designresponsive.”
builder selected must be that responsive and responsible design96
builder whose adjusted score is the lowest.” In stating how this
award must be made, the statute imposes the following
independent duty on the commissioner: “Unless all proposals are
rejected, the commissioner shall award the contract to the
responsive and responsible design-builder with the lowest adjusted
97
score.” Clearly, by the repeated use of the word “responsive,” a
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

§ 161.3426 subdiv. 1(d).
Id. at subdiv. 1(a).
Id. at subdiv. 3.
§ 161.3412 subdiv. 3(a).
Id.; § 161.3414 (2006).
§ 161.3426 subdiv. 1(a).
Id. at subdiv. 1(b).
Id. at subdiv. 1(d).
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well understood term of art, and the mandatory injunction only to
award to the responsive proposer, the Legislature intended
MnDOT to enforce the principle of rejecting materially nonresponsive proposals. Indeed, it is pointless for the statute to
require MnDOT to clearly state and weight its RFP evaluation
criteria if, by ignoring the principles of responsiveness, those
criteria can be disregarded or effectively modified by the Technical
Review Committee.
4. The Trend Continues: Department of Administration, University
of Minnesota, and the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities
In 2005, the Legislature introduced new procurement options
for the Minnesota Department of Administration, the University of
Minnesota (U of M), and the Minnesota State Colleges and
98
The administrative department and
Universities (MnSCU).
MnSCU were granted authority to use construction manager at risk
99
(CM at Risk) and job order contracting. All three entities were
100
Before the
given authority to use design-build contracting.
administrative department or MnSCU can use CM at Risk or
design-build contracting, however, the administrative department
commissioner or the Board of Trustees of MnSCU, as appropriate,
must make a written determination, including specific findings,
101
that the desired method serves the public interest.
This
requirement is designed to ensure that the new procurement
methods are not used on projects for which they may not be best
suited.
To make sure that these new procedures did not
immediately displace the old, the Legislature also limited the
number of projects on which CM at Risk and design-build
102
contracting can be used.
98. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 16C.32–.35 (2006); Act of May 25, 2005, ch. 78,
2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 417 (West).
99. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(a)(2)–(3). The definition of the term “commissioner”
in section 16C.32 subdivision 1(6) limits the applicability of the new contracting
methods to the administrative department and MnSCU. See also § 16C.34
(detailing constructing manager at risk); § 16C.35 (detailing job order
contracting).
100. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(a)(1) (granting authority for designbuild contracting to Minnesota Department of Administration and MnSCU); §
16C.33 subdiv. 4 (granting design-build contracting authority to U of M).
101. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(e).
102. See id. at subdiv. 2(b) (limiting the administrative department and
MnSCU use of CM at Risk and design-build contracting to no more than five
percent of its projects in 2006 and 2007 and no more than ten percent thereafter);
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Design-Build

Two types of design-build procurements are authorized. The
103
As its name
first is Qualifications Based Selections (QBS).
implies, the QBS method focuses on qualifications. To start a QBS
design-build procurement, the agency issues an RFQ that lists the
weighted criteria and subcriteria that will be used to evaluate the
104
At a minimum, the criteria to be evaluated shall
proposals.
include the proposer’s experience as a constructor, designer or
design-builder, its key personnel, its technical competence, its past
performance on similar projects, its safety record, and its
105
availability to and familiarity with project locale.
The last
criterion was demanded by out-of-state contractors and designers
who wanted some evaluation credit for their proximity to a local
project.
So that quality concerns do not overwhelm or render
irrelevant the issue of cost, the solicitation may also ask the
proposers to state the proposed overhead and fee that the design106
builder proposes to charge for its construction services.
The
proposers’ qualifications are then judged by the state Designer
Selection Board and it creates a short list of at least three, but not
107
more than five, proposers.
After receiving proposals from the
short-listed proposers, the Board conducts formal interviews of the
108
short-listed proposers.
The administrative department
commissioner must award the design-build contract to the
proposer that scores the highest based on the established
evaluation criteria and subcriteria as determined by the Board,
109
For both
unless the commissioner elects to reject all proposals.
the U of M and MnSCU, the state Designer Selection Board
recommends the top two scoring proposers to the U of M Board of
Regents or the MnSCU Board of Trustees, as appropriate, which
110
then makes the final selection.
§ 16C.33 subdiv. 4(d) (imposing similar limits on design-build contracting for U of
M.).
103. § 16C.33 subdiv. 5.
104. Id. at subdiv. 5(a)(1).
105. Id. at subdiv. 5(a)(2).
106. Id. at subdiv. 5(a)(3).
107. Id. at subdiv. 5(b).
108. Id. at subdiv. 5(c).
109. See id. at subdivs. 4(c) (for U of M), 5(d) (for the administrative
department and MnSCU).
110. Id. at subdivs. 4(c), 5(d).
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The second type of design-build procurement is Design-Price
111
This method also uses a two-step
Based Selection (DPBS).
process. First, the agency uses an RFQ process very similar to the
112
QBS/RFQ process to narrow the field of potential proposers. In
the second stage, the administrative department, U of M, or
MnSCU issues an RFP to the short-listed competitors, the state
Designer Selection Board evaluates the proposals according to the
criteria and subcriteria defined and weighted in the RFP, and the
commissioner must award the contract to the highest scoring
113
proposer as determined by the Board. Because the DPBS method
primarily evaluates the design and proposed price, the RFP solicits
preliminary plans and specifications, a critical path method
114
schedule, and a guaranteed maximum price for the project.
b.

Construction Management at Risk
115

The CM at Risk selection process also consists of two stages.
The first involves an RFQ process, the specifics of which are very
similar to the RFQ for either the QBS or DPBS design-build
116
process. Because the respective cost for the CM at Risk’s services
is necessary for a rational comparison of proposals, the
commissioner may include in the RFQ a request for the proposer’s
117
overhead and fee for the CM at Risk’s services.
The commissioner is required to create a selection committee
to evaluate the RFQs and RFPs of at least three persons, at least one
of whom must have construction industry expertise to provide the
118
The selection
evaluations with some informed foundation.
committee must announce the weighted criteria and subcriteria to
111. Id. at subdivs. 7–8.
112. Id. at subdiv. 7(a).
113. Id. at subdivs. 7–8. As in QBS design-build procurement, the top two
scoring proposers on U of M and MnSCU procurements are submitted to the U of
M Board of Regents or the MnSCU Board of Trustees, as appropriate, for final
selection. Id. at subdiv. 8(a).
114. Id. at subdiv. 7(c).
115. § 16C.34. A “construction manager at risk” is a person or entity selected
to manage the construction process and be responsible, among other things, for
the price, schedule, and workmanship of the construction performed. § 16C.32
subdiv. 1(7).
116. § 16C.34 subdiv. 1; see also supra Part I.B.4.a.
117. § 16C.34 subdiv. 1(b).
Just as in the design-build process, the
“commissioner” means not only the administrative department commissioner but
also the MnSCU Board of Trustees. See supra note 99.
118. § 16C.34 subdiv. 2(a)(1).
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119

be used in scoring the RFQs and RFPs and then proceed to select
a short list of three to five proposers for the more detailed phase
120
two RFP process.
During the second phase, the selection
committee requests fee and expense proposals, conducts formal
121
interviews with each proposer, and then recommends to the
commissioner the CM at Risk proposer achieving the highest score
122
according to the weighted criteria stated in the RFP. The CM at
123
Risk is selected before the project design is complete, which
means that final pricing for the work must be obtained later in the
process. In an attempt to ensure competitive pricing after contract
award, the statute requires that the CM at Risk competitively bid all
124
trade work from a list of qualified firms.
A competitively bid
process is different than a publicly bid process. In the latter, all
responsible contractors may bid, but in the former, the CM at Risk
and the commissioner are allowed to determine the composition of
125
the list of qualified subtrades allowed to bid on the work.
c.

Job Order Contracting

Job Order Contracting was designed to create an expedited
126
MnSCU was
method of awarding smaller sized projects.
especially frustrated with the delays involved in traditional public
bidding and successfully lobbied for a process by which any
119. Id. at subdiv. 2(a)(2).
120. Id. at subdiv. 2(c)(1).
121. The post proposal interview process is designed to further
communications between the proposer and the agency, but it can also foster
complaints. If the interviewers are not the same, or if they ask dissimilar
questions, proposers could feel that the interview process is unevenly conducted
and that it provides some proposers with competitive advantages over others.
Hopefully, the agency’s evaluation procedures, adopted pursuant to the statutory
requirement to conduct these new procurements in “an open, competitive, and
objective manner,” will guard against these potential problems. See MINN. STAT. §
16C.33 subdiv. 5(a)(1) (2006) (QBS); id. at subdiv. 7(a)(2) (DPBS); § 16C.34
subdiv. 1(c)(2) (CM at Risk). Fortunately, the statute at least prevents the agency
from sharing price and other confidential information among the proposers.
MINN. STAT. § 16C.34 subdiv. 2(c)(3) (2006).
122. § 16C.34 subdiv. 2(c)(4).
123. One of the purposes of selecting the CM at Risk method of project
delivery is to allow the CM at Risk to offer preconstruction services such as “value
engineering” (cost saving) suggestions, constructability reviews, and accurate
pricing of the plans and specifications as they are being developed. 2 BRUNER &
O’CONNOR, supra note 22, at §§ 6:22, 6:59.
124. § 16C.34 subdiv. 3(e).
125. Id.
126. § 16C.35.
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contractor who agreed to sign a standard, master agency contract
127
Once the
would be pre-qualified to perform the agency’s work.
list of qualified contractors is created, the agency can request bids
from any (but not necessarily all) contractors on the list without
128
For construction contracts up
advertisement or public bidding.
to $50,000, the agency must request at least two bids; for contracts
up to $100,000, the agency must request at least three bids; for
contracts up to $250,000, the agency must request at least four
129
130
bids.
The award must be made to the lowest bidder.
The
agency head is responsible for developing a system to ensure a
reasonable opportunity for all qualified contractors to bid on
131
construction services on a “periodic” basis.
d.

Risks and Protections

The design-build, CM at Risk, and job order contracting
procurement methods invest the administrative department, U of
M, and MnSCU with increased discretion in determining the
successful proposer or bidder. Just like the MnDOT design-build
statute, however, the final version of Minnesota Statute sections
16C.32–.35 was a unique collaborative effort that contained
132
language agreed upon by all industry and agency stakeholders.
As a result of its careful drafting and the respect given to needs and
interests of all stakeholders, the statute contains many protections

127. Id. at subdiv. 3.
128. Id. at subdiv. 4.
129. Id.
130. Id. at subdiv 5.
131. Id. at subdiv. 6. It may be difficult to explain to qualified bidders why they
are unable to bid on job order contracting projects simply because it is not their
turn to do so. Similarly, it may be difficult to explain to the public why it is
advantageous to limit competition to two, three, or four bidders depending on the
size of the project if other bidders desire to submit bids. Small, emerging
contractors often depend on small contracts to get established, and this system
may make it unduly difficult for them to get an adequate volume of work.
132. Indeed, the drafting effort for Minnesota Statutes sections 16C.32–.35
spanned several years and involved periodic stakeholder drafting sessions
involving, among others, the administrative board, U of M, MnSCU, the
Minnesota Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, the Minnesota Chapter
of the American Institute of Architects, and the Construction Law Society of the
MSBA. For a sense of the widespread agreement on the terms of the statute, see
Hearing on S.F. 1335 Before the Senate State and Local Government Operations Committee,
84th
Leg.
Sess.
(Minn.
March
16,
2005),
available
at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/media/media_list.php?ls=84&archive_year=20
05& category=committee&type=audio#header.
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that establish parameters on the discretion given to public agencies
in this legislation.
In an effort to insulate the affected agencies or institutions
from political pressure, undue influence, and accusations of
favoritism, the statute admirably requires that the independent
state Designer Selection Board be the entity charged with
evaluating and scoring the successful design-build proposer.
Ironically, the Designer Selection Board selects the top candidate
for the administrative department, but only the top two candidates
for the U of M and MnSCU, even though the latter two entities are
more prone to influence through donations to the college. After
receiving the top two choices from the Designer Selection Board,
the U of M and MnSCU are given the discretion to evaluate and
133
select the successful proposer.
To bring more objectivity and transparency to the selection
process, the agency has to list the selection criteria and subcriteria
for each stage of the process and the relative evaluation weight that
134
As a result, each
each criterion or subcriterion will be given.
proposer should be better able to match what they propose to
supply with what the agency demands, thereby creating an
economically more efficient procurement. Furthermore, the award
must be made to the proposer whose proposal scores the highest
according to the weighted criteria. This protection should reduce
concerns about excessive discretion and after-the-fact justifications
for awards; it also logically requires that only responsive proposals
will be received and scored.
To encourage competition in both the design-build and CM at
Risk methods and to limit the agencies’ discretion in the selection
of criteria, the statute requires that any RFQ or RFP “criteria shall
not impose unnecessary conditions beyond reasonable
requirements to ensure maximum participation of qualified”
135
Both methods further limit the
design-builders or CMs at Risk.
acceptable criteria by stating that “[t]he criteria shall not consider
the collective bargaining status” of the design-builder or CM at

133. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.33 subdiv. 4(c) (2006) (allowing U of M Board of
Regents to select from the Board’s top two recommendations); id. at subdivs. 5(d),
8(a) (allowing the MnSCU Board of Trustees to select from the Board’s top two
recommendations).
134. See, e.g., id. at subdivs. 3(b)(2), 5(a)(1), 5(b), 5(d), 7(a)(2), 8(a); MINN.
STAT. § 16C.34 subdiv. 1(c)(2) (2006).
135. § 16C.33 subdiv. 3(b)(10); § 16C.34 subdiv. 1(c)(9).
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136

Risk.
The requirement to ensure maximum participation is
especially important, and statutorily required, when QBS designbuilders and CMs at Risk conduct competitive bidding of subtrade
137
work.
Since only those subtrades on a list determined by the
commissioner and design-builder or CM at Risk are invited to
138
submit competitive bids, there could be complaints or concerns
from those subcontractors who feel they are qualified to bid but are
not invited to participate in the process. The statute attempts to
address those concerns by requiring that the list be “based upon an
open, competitive, and objective prequalification process” and by
139
prohibiting unduly restrictive selection criteria.
To ensure that these new methods are used only in
appropriate circumstances, the commissioner, for each designbuild or CM at Risk contract, must make a written determination,
including specific findings, indicating whether use of the design140
As
build or CM at Risk procurement serves the public interest.
the MnDOT design-build statute recognized, not every project is
141
appropriate for best value design-build or CM at Risk methods,
which is why findings justifying their use are essential to determine
whether it would be preferable to specify the desired best value
features in the plans and specifications so they can be priced as
part of a low cost bid procurement to avoid unnecessary and
potentially harmful subjectivity in the award process. Other issues
that the commissioner’s findings should address include, without
limitation, the extent to which the project requirements for design
and construction can be adequately defined, the time constraints
for delivery of the project, the capability and experience of
potential contractors, the suitability of the project for alternative
delivery methods in regard to time, cost, schedule and quality
factors, and the capability and experience of the agency and its
personnel to adequately manage and oversee the selected delivery
142
method.

136. § 16C.33 subdiv. 3(b)(10); § 16C.34 1(c)(9). This provision was insisted
upon by representatives of the Minnesota Chapter of the Associated Builders and
Contractors, an organization representing non-union or “open shop” contractors,
as a condition of their support for the legislation.
137. § 16C.33 subdiv. 6(b)–(c); § 16C.34 subdivs. 2(a)(2), 3(e).
138. See supra note 137.
139. Id.
140. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(e).
141. § 161.3414.
142. Id. at subdiv. 2.
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In an attempt to further protect the integrity of the process,
the agency cannot consider a proposer’s past claims history in the
143
RFQ and RFP process.
Thus, design-builders and CMs at Risk
may assert claims on projects without fear of reprisal or “blacklisting” on future design-build or CM at Risk procurements.
The amount of time and expense required to generate
preliminary designs, schedules, and pricing in response to a phase
two RFP on a DPBS design-build solicitation can be significant, and
a concern existed that only large regional or national firms would
be able to afford to compete in this process over time. To address
this concern, the amount of design work requested in an RFP
cannot be exceeded by design-builders, which is intended to
prevent larger design-builders from outscoring their competition
by simply spending more money generating many more plan sheets
144
Therefore, unless
than smaller design-builders can afford.
compensated in excess of the minimum stipend for their effort, the
statute prohibits proposers from being required to submit detailed
architectural or engineering design or construction documents as
145
part of the proposal. To encourage competition, the short-listed
phase two proposers are also entitled to a stipend to cover the cost
of generating their design proposals in an amount of not less than
0.3 percent of the commissioner’s estimated cost of design and
146
If the RFP requires extensive design services
construction.
beyond preliminary plans and specifications, the stipend is
required to be adjusted to an amount commensurate with the
147
amount of requested design services. Design-build experience is
typically one of the scoring factors, and those who can financially
afford to continually compete over time would obtain more
experience and increase their chances of selection. The stipend
concept was designed to encourage competition by leveling the
playing field and paying proposers up front for the services
required of them.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

§ 16C.32 subdiv. 1(17).
§ 16C.33 subdiv. 7(f).
Id.
Id. at subdiv. 7(g).
Id.
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II. THE 2007 BEST VALUE LEGISLATION
On May 24, 2007, the Legislature presented the Omnibus State
148
Article Three of this
Government Finance Bill to the governor.
149
bill was entitled “Best Value Contracts.”
Governor Pawlenty
150
signed it into law the next day.
A.

151

Key Provisions of the Legislation

The legislation mandates that all building and construction
contracts let by the Commissioner of Administration follow the
procedures dictated in Minnesota Statutes section 16C.28, and it
directs the commissioner to establish procedures for developing
152
RFPs and awarding contracts. The enabling section requires the
criteria used for selection to be included in the solicitation
document, and it requires that the evaluation must be done “in an
153
open and competitive manner.”
The legislation allows “all state building and construction
contracts” let by the Commissioner of Administration “or an agency
for which competitive bids or proposals are required” to use either the
154
lowest responsible bidder or the best value method. The statute
re-emphasizes that if the best value method is used, the solicitation
document must include the weighted evaluation criteria, and the
155
contract must be awarded to the best scoring proposal.
The definition of best value was expanded for construction
156
contracts.
Best value procurement must consider price and
148. H.F. No. 548, 85th Leg. Sess., 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1690, 1734–44
(West).
149. Id. art. 3, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. at 1734–44.
150. Act of May 25, 2007, H.F. No. 548, ch. 148, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1690 (West). This hurried passage prevented full and thorough consideration by
all stakeholders; it was primarily driven by union pressures. Dean B. Thomson,
The New Era of Best Value Public Procurement, CONSTRUCTION L. BRIEFING PAPER
(Fabyanske, Westra, Hart & Thomson, P.A., June 2007), available at
http://www.fwhtlaw.com/articles/Briefing%20Papers%20in%20html/2007%20Ju
ne.htm.
151. All statutory citations in this part refer to the statute as added or amended
by the Omnibus State Government Finance Act.
152. MINN. STAT. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3a (Supp. 2007). The term “commissioner”
is defined as “the commissioner of administration.” § 16C.02 subdiv. 5.
153. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3a.
154. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1(a) (emphasis added). The italicized language seems
to broaden the applicability of this section beyond the department of
administration.
155. Id. at subdiv. 1(c).
156. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4(a). The alternate definition of best value is
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157

performance criteria.
That statute then suggests, but does not
require, the following non-exclusive performance criteria:
(1)

the quality of the vendor’s
performance on previous projects;

or

contractor’s

(2)

the timeliness of the vendor’s or contractor’s
performance on previous projects;

(3)

the level of customer satisfaction with the vendor’s or
contractor’s performance on previous projects;

(4)

the vendor’s or contractor’s record of performing
previous projects on budget and ability to minimize
cost overruns;

(5)

the vendor’s or contractor’s ability to minimize
change orders;

(6)

the vendor’s or contractor’s ability to prepare
appropriate project plans;

(7)

the vendor’s or contractor’s technical capacities;

(8)

the individual qualifications of the contractor’s key
personnel; or

(9)

the vendor’s or contractor’s ability to assess and
158
minimize risks.

When considering past performance, however, the contracting
entity cannot consider “the exercise or assertion of a person’s legal
159
rights.”
Recognizing that the implementation of best value contracting
is a big shift in procurement policy, the Legislature is
implementing the new method gradually. For the first three years
distinguishable because it only applies to the acquisition of goods and services. Id.
at subdiv. 4.
157. Id. at subdiv. 4(a).
158. Id.
159. Id. In other words, the contracting entity cannot consider a proposer’s
claims history.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/9

24

Thomson et al.: A Critique of Best Value Contracting in Minnesota
2. THOMSON - ADC.DOC

2007]

12/15/2007 3:44:28 PM

BEST VALUE CONTRACTING

49

that any organization uses best value contracting, it can only use it
160
For the first two years
on up to twenty percent of its projects.
following the enactment of the legislation, only state agencies,
counties, cities, and the largest twenty-five percent of school
161
After two years, the
districts may use best value contracting.
162
largest fifty percent of school districts may use it as well. Finally,
three years after enactment, the use of best value contracting is
unrestricted for all other school districts and political subdivisions
163
of the state. In a final attempt to improve implementation of the
legislation, all personnel administering best value contracts or
writing solicitation documents must be trained in best value
164
procedures.
B. Applicability of Best Value Contracting
While sections 16C.03 and 16C.28 appear to make best value
contracting an option for all building and construction contracts in
the state, over the years, the Legislature has enacted a patchwork of
provisions empowering Minnesota’s various types of political
entities and subdivisions to enter into contracts, and it has also
specified the procedures those entities are to use. The following
table shows the applicable statutory provision governing
contracting for various political entities, indicates whether the 2007
best value legislation changed that provision, and describes the
authorized contracting method.

160. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1a(f).
161. Id. at subdiv. 1a(c).
162. Id. at subdiv. 1a(d).
163. Id. at subdiv. 1a(e).
164. § 16C.03 subdiv. 19. The statute does not specify the length, curriculum,
or source of the training.
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16C.33–
.35

103D.811

103E.505
110A.29
115A.69

116A.13

123B.52

160.17
160.262
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Entity Type
Governed

Expressly
Modified
by 2007
Legislation

Contract
Award
Procedure
Authorized

Section
16C.28
Applies?

Admin.
Dept.,
U of M, and
MnSCU
Watershed
District

No

Best Value

No

Yes

Yes

Drainage
Authority
Rural Water
Use District
Solid Waste
Mgmt.
District

Yes

Lowest
Responsible
Bidder
(LRB) or
Best Value
LRB or Best
Value
Sealed
Bidding
LRB or Best
Value

No
No

[Vol. 34:1

Notes

Yes
No
Yes

Public Water
and Sewer
Systems
School
District

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

Town or
County
MnDOT

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

Applies to
construction,
building,
alterations,
improvements, or
repair work.
Applies to road
construction.
Applies to
construction of
bicycle and
pedestrian paths
(“recreational
lanes”).
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161.32

MnDOT

Expressly
Modified
by 2007
Legislation
Yes

161.3206

MnDOT

Yes

Best Value
(Permissive)

No

161.3412

MnDOT

No

Best Value
(Permissive)

No

161.38

Road
Authority
Town

Yes

LRB or Best
Value
LRB or Best
Value
LRB or Best
Value

No

365.37
374.13
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Entity Type
Governed

City and
County

Yes
Yes

Contract
Award
Procedure
Authorized
LRB or Best
Value

51

Section
16C.28
Applies?
Yes

Notes

Applies to trunk
highway
construction.
Applies to all
MnDOT
contracts other
than design-build
contracts
governed by
section 161.3412.
Statute does not
prohibit other
types of
contracting.
Applies to
MnDOT designbuild projects.
Statute does not
prohibit other
types of
contracting.

Yes
Yes

Applies to
construction of
joint city hall and
county
courthouse.
Statute language
calls for award to
proposal that is
“most favorable
to the city or
county” rather
than the usual
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Entity Type
Governed

Expressly
Modified
by 2007
Legislation
Yes

Contract
Award
Procedure
Authorized
LRB or Best
Value
LRB or Best
Value

Section
16C.28
Applies?

375.21

County

383B.145

Hennepin
County

No

383B.158

Hennepin
County

No

Best Value
(Permissive)

Yes

383C.094

St. Louis
County

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

383C.807

St. Louis
County

No

No

412.311

Statutory
Cities

Yes

Any means
determined
by St. Louis
County
Board
LRB or Best
Value
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lowest
responsible
bidder.
Notes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Subdivision 8
directs award to
go to lowest
bidder, but also
has an override
provision that
looks like a best
value approach.
This statute
authorizes
design-build
contracts that
may use best
value.
Applies to
contracts for
cleaning and
repair of ditches
over $500.00.
Applies to solid
waste facilities.

Applies to
construction,
building,
alteration,
improvement, or
repair.
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Entity Type
Governed

Expressly
Modified
by 2007
Legislation
Yes

Contract
Award
Procedure
Authorized
LRB or Best
Value

53

Section
16C.28
Applies?

429.041

Municipality

447.31

Hospital
District

No

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

453.59

Municipal
Power
Agency
Municipal
Gas Agency
Western
Lake
Sanitary
District
Hous. and
Redevelopment
Authority
Port
Authority

No

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

No

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

469.101

Economic
Dev.
Authority

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

471.345

Municipal-ity

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

453A.09
458D.21

469.015

469.068
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Yes

Notes

Municipality is
defined in
section 429.041.
Applies to any
civic
improvement
project.

Best Value for
contracts greater
than $5,000.00.

This is the
UMCL.
Subdivision 1
defines
municipality.
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Entity Type
Governed

Expressly
Modified
by 2007
Legislation
No

Contract
Award
Procedure
Authorized
Best Value

Section
16C.28
Applies?

471.371

Municipality

473.405

Metro.
Council

Indirectly

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

473.523

Metro.
Council

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

473.556

Metro.
Sports
Facilities
Comm’n
Metro.
Airport
Comm’n
Metro.
Council

No

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

No

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

Indirectly

LRB

No

Minnesota
Ballpark
Authority

Yes

LRB or Best
Value

Yes

473.652

473.705

473.756

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/9

No

[Vol. 34:1

Notes

Applies to designbuild contracts
for wastewater
treatment
facilities.
Municipality is
defined in
section 471.345
subdivision 1.
Section 473.123
subdivision 1
defines the
Metro. Council as
a political
subdivision of the
state so the
UMCL applies.
Applies to
Metropolitan
disposal system
construction
contracts over
$50,000.00.

Applies to
Mosquito
Control.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW BEST VALUE LEGISLATION
It remains to be seen whether the new 2007 best value
legislation will result in the best and most economically responsible
procurements of public construction. The bill was drafted,
reviewed, and passed in a matter of months, and many stakeholders
were not able to provide comments or meaningfully participate in
the development of the legislation. As a result, the present
legislation regrettably bears the marks of its hurried passage and
raises significant questions and concerns that will need to be
resolved either by good practice, statutory amendment, or court
decision. This section of the article analyzes many issues raised by
the new legislation and suggests how these questions might be
resolved to ensure that the public truly receives the best value.
A. Standards of Judicial Review of Best Value Procurements
The new best value legislation does not alter the traditional
role of the courts to oversee public procurements through bid
protests filed by taxpayers or bidders. At least two standards of
review will apply to judicial review of best value procurements.
165
First, “[i]rrespective of what lawful
Both are found in Griswold.
method is adopted or used in the letting of public contracts, it is
for the courts to determine whether officials in the exercise of their
discretion have applied the method used in an arbitrary,
166
capricious, or unreasonable manner.”
Thus, a procurement is
subject to being set aside by the courts if the public body awards a
contract in violation of this standard.
The “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” standard is not as
high or as difficult to establish as one might think. Administrative
decisions that reflect an error of law, or that are made without
substantial evidence, for example, would be subject to being
167
And, a decision is arbitrary and
overturned by the courts.
capricious if the agency relied on unintended factors, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation that runs counter to the evidence, or the decision is so

165. Griswold v. Ramsey County, 242 Minn. 529, 65 N.W.2d 647 (1954).
166. Id. at 535, 65 N.W.2d at 651–52.
167. Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi County Bd. of
Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Minn. 2006).
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implausible that it can not be explained as a difference in opinion
168
or an exercise of the agency’s expertise.
Further, the courts’ powers are not limited to reviewing solely
the issue of whether the award was made in an arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable manner. The courts also have a duty under
Griswold to make sure that all the procurements, including best
value competitive bidding, is conducted in a way that safeguards
the public from fraud, favoritism, improvidence, and
169
extravagance because safeguarding the public is the intent of any
170
Historically, protestors did not
statutory procurement method.
commonly invoke the objective “improvidence” or “extravagance”
standard announced by Griswold to challenge the validity of a
contract award. This is likely to change with the advent of best
value procurement, which could result in contracts being let to the
highest priced bidder. Under Griswold, the courts must void any
contract awarded based on a competitive best value procedure that,
while purporting to represent the “best value,” would still waste
public funds to such an egregious extent as to constitute
171
“extravagance,” “improvidence,” or even “fraud” on the public.
One could foresee challenges of this nature where the solicitation
for bids does not specify the quantity or quality of the desired
construction to be provided, and the award is made to the bidder
who goes overboard supplying far higher quantities or qualities
than actually needed at far greater cost.
B. The Requirement of Openness in Best Value Procurement
The new best value legislation provides that best value
proposals “must be evaluated in an open and competitive
172
manner.”
The legislation does not provide much guidance on
how “open” evaluations are to occur, but ordinarily, the public is
168. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983); Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev., 713 N.W.2d at 832.
169. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 535–36, 65 N.W.2d at 652.
170. Id. at 535, 65 N.W.2d at 652.
171. See id. at 535–36, 65 N.W.2d at 652 (“Generally it is presumed that public
officials have entered into public contracts in good faith and actual fraud in a
particular instance must be proved, but this rule has no application in a
determination of whether the requirements of competitive bidding have been met
in the letting of a contract and, as a matter of sound public policy, such a contract
is void, without any showing of actual fraud or an intent to commit fraud, if a
procedure has been followed which emasculates the safeguards of competitive
bidding.”).
172. MINN. STAT. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3(a) (Supp. 2007).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/9

32

Thomson et al.: A Critique of Best Value Contracting in Minnesota
2. THOMSON - ADC.DOC

2007]

12/15/2007 3:44:28 PM

BEST VALUE CONTRACTING

57

best served by complete transparency. Again, prior decisions of
Minnesota’s courts provide guidance on how to interpret the new
legislation.
First, there should be little question that the requirement of
openness was included in the legislation so that procurement
decisions are completely transparent. Transparency is necessary in
public procurements to avoid any appearance of fraud, favoritism,
or undue influence. Transparency and openness are also necessary
to avoid neutralizing “a most important deterrent to fraud and
improvidence in the letting of public contracts; namely, timely
preventive action by taxpayers who, in order to act effectively, must
173
acquire a knowledge of the true facts before it is too late.”
The
courts have long encouraged the policing of public procurement
174
by bid protest actions filed either by taxpayers or losing bidders.
By including an openness requirement in the new best value
legislation, the Legislature also has voiced its approval of such
actions because the deterrent effect of bid protest actions would be
lessened if the evaluations were not completely open and available
to public scrutiny.
To be sure, the new legislation does not in any way modify
ancient case law recognizing the rights of taxpayers to lodge
175
protests against invalid procurements.
Nor does the new
173. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 537, 65 N.W.2d at 653.
174. Id. See also Tel. Assocs., Inc. v. St. Louis County Bd., 364 N.W.2d 378, 383
(Minn. 1985).
175. Since at least 1902, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized
taxpayer standing to sue public bodies and protest awards of public contracts. See
Schiffman v. City of St. Paul, 88 Minn. 43, 92 N.W. 503 (1902).
Where a taxpayer has no adequate remedy at law, he has a right in his
own name to resort to a court of equity to restrain by injunction a
municipal corporation and its officers from illegally creating debts and
liabilities which will increase his burdens of taxation; and this upon the
theory that the damages which he will thus sustain are not in common
with the damages to other taxpayers, but are special, affecting his private
rights.
Id. at 47, 92 N.W. at 504. See also Arpin v. City of Thief River Falls, 122 Minn. 34,
37–38, 141 N.W. 833, 834 (1913) (holding that taxpayers have standing to
challenge a city’s attempt to enter into an illegal contract); Le Tourneau v. Hugo,
90 Minn. 420, 425–26, 97 N.W. 115, 117–18 (1903) (holding that taxpayers have
standing to enjoin the execution of a contract for construction of a bridge that was
let through an impermissible bidding process). Many leading Minnesota cases on
public procurement were suits brought by taxpayers challenging improper
government procurement practices. See, e.g., Nielsen v. City of Saint Paul, 252
Minn. 12, 88 N.W.2d 853 (1958); Griswold, 242 Minn. 529, 65 N.W.2d 647; Coller v.
City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 26 N.W.2d 835 (1947); Hendricks v. City of
Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N.W. 428 (1940).
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legislation limit the well-settled power or jurisdiction of the courts
to hear those protests to ensure that the due process rights of
taxpayers are protected and that the intent of competitive bidding
176
statutes is met.
Nevertheless, in a recent and troubling trend, certain public
agencies are attempting to screen their decisions from public or
judicial review by making it practically impossible to protest their
awards. For example, MnDOT’s solicitation for the reconstruction
of the collapsed I-35W bridge attempted to require proposers to
waive their right to judicial review unless the agency’s decision was
“wholly arbitrary;” and then, in order to deter any protests, it
claimed the right to assess all costs and damages (including delays
and legal fees) of a protest against the proposer if the protest was
177
The agency also required protests regarding nondenied.
responsiveness to be filed within twenty-four hours, even though it
would be impossible to determine in one day whether proposals on
178
MnDOT
such a complicated procurement were responsive.
further refused to disclose its scoring data and the proposals it
received until it had formally awarded the project, making any
179
meaningful review of its actions prior to award impossible.
MnDOT then finally awarded the project, but immediately
executed the contract only moments later, further frustrating any
possible proposer or taxpayer review of agency action before
MnDOT committed the state to a $234 million contract that cost
the taxpayers $85 million more in tax dollars and lost opportunity
180
costs than an available alternative proposal.
The Minnesota Supreme Court expressly reserved to the
courts the right to review agency action to determine whether a
181
Public
procurement decision is illegal, arbitrary, or capricious.
bodies or agencies should not be able to limit that judicial review
or heighten the judicial standard of review from “arbitrary and

176.
177.

See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
See MNDOT INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSERS, ST. ANTHONY FALLS (I-35W)
BRIDGE DESIGN-BUILD PROJECT add. 7, ¶ 3.10 (Sept. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.dot.state.mn.us/designbuild/35wbrproject.html.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Jim Foti, Judge Rejects Effort to Stop I-35W Bridge Work, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Nov. 1, 2007, at B5; Dave Orrick, Judge Refuses to Halt Bridge Work,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Nov. 1, 2007, at 6B.
181. Griswold v. Ramsey County, 242 Minn. 529, 535, 65 N.W.2d 647, 651–52
(1954).
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182

capricious” to “wholly arbitrary.” The Minnesota Supreme Court
183
encouraged protests and declared them to be the best safeguard
184
against fraud and improvidence.
Therefore, it is against public
policy to: (1) withhold data from the public and other proposers;
(2) prevent their ability to protect; (3) create practically impossible
protest deadlines; and (4) penalize protesting proposers for acting
185
as private attorney generals for the benefit of the public. Rather
than force protesters to fight these new types of protest restrictions
in court on a case-by-case basis, the Legislature should amend the
2007 best value legislation and the Minnesota Data Practices Act to
prevent these various attempts by public bodies and agencies to
shield their decisions from public review and scrutiny. It should
ensure that: (1) protests be facilitated, not penalized; (2) the Data
Practices Act be amended to allow earlier release of scoring data
186
and proposals; (3) there is an adequate time specified between
award and contract execution to allow for meaningful review and
potential protest of agency action; and (4) there is an unrestricted
right to standard judicial review of agency action.
Once a public body has decided to award a contract, the “open
evaluation” requirement in section 16C.03, subdivision 3a, should
require it to publicly post all of the data and rationales it relied
upon to make the best value award. This would give the public and
other proposers a chance to review the award to make sure it
complied with the rules and requirements of the solicitation. With
the advent of new legislation, it should no longer be necessary for
taxpayers and proposers to obtain information about a public
body’s procurement by making a request pursuant to the
187
Minnesota Government Data Practices Act; all of the information
to be obtained by such a request should readily and automatically
be made public by the agency or municipality. As a result, the
182. See Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 326, 19 N.W.2d 795, 799
(1945) (review of agency decisions must be meaningful to satisfy due process
concerns); In re Staley, 730 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (calling a
meaningful opportunity to present a case “the hallmark of an individual’s right to
due process of law”).
183. Tel. Assocs., Inc. v. St. Louis County Bd., 364 N.W.2d 378, 382–83 (Minn.
1985).
184. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 537, 65 N.W.2d at 653.
185. See Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 725 N.W.2d 90, 93
(Minn. 2006) (holding that courts will refuse to enforce contracts that are
contrary to public policy).
186. MINN. STAT. § 13.72 subdiv. 11 (2006).
187. § 13.03.
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taxpaying public will have confidence that public officials are wisely
protecting the public purse.
In addition, the new best value legislation provides that if
interviews are to be a scored criterion, the weight of the interview is
188
Because proposals
to be stated in the solicitation for proposals.
are to be evaluated in an “open” manner pursuant to section
16C.03, subdivision 3a, any interviews must also be conducted and
evaluated in an “open” manner. Yet, the new legislation is silent on
how that is to happen. Face-to-face meetings between bidders and
the public body might present an opportunity for bidders to curry
favor or for agents of the public body to demand concessions or
favors in ways that undermine the integrity of the process. Thus, if
bidders are to meet with the public body face-to-face before an
award, there should be strong checks and balances on such
189
meetings to avoid any appearance of fraud or favoritism.
The
integrity of the best value bidding procedures would be best served
if the public body was required to ask the same questions of all
bidders so that all proposers are offered an equal opportunity to
compete on a level playing field, and all the answers to the
questions could be objectively compared and scored on an “applesto-apples” basis. Indeed, it would be very difficult to competitively
and objectively score an interview if each bidder was asked
completely different questions. In addition, a public body would
be wise to record or videotape the interviews to provide proof that
the interviews were conducted impartially, openly, and
competitively.
C. A Threshold Question: Should the Lowest Responsible Bidder Method
or the Best Value Method be Used?
The 2007 best value legislation provides that contracts may be
awarded to either of the following:
(1) the lowest responsible bidder . . . ; or (2) the
vendor or contractor offering the best value, taking
188. MINN. STAT. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1(c) (Supp. 2007).
189. See Griswold, 242 Minn. at 535–36, 65 N.W.2d at 652 (“Generally it is
presumed that public officials have entered into public contracts in good faith and
actual fraud in a particular instance must be proved, but this rule has no
application in a determination of whether the requirements of competitive
bidding have been met in the letting of a contract and, as a matter of sound public
policy, such a contract is void, without any showing of actual fraud or an intent to
commit fraud, if a procedure has been followed which emasculates the safeguards
of competitive bidding.”).
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into account the specifications of the request for
proposals [and] the price and performance criteria as
set forth in section 16C.02, subdivision 4a, and [as]
190
described in the solicitation document.
Unfortunately, the legislation offers no guidance on the issue
of how to decide whether the contract should be awarded by the
191
A
lowest responsible bidder method or the best value method.
wrong choice of method could be challenged under either of the
standards of review identified in Part III.A of this article.
As mentioned in Part I of this article, prior court decisions
provide sound guidance on the question of whether a public body
should use lowest responsible bidder or best value procurements.
192
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake, for example, the
court suggested that factors other than cost should be considered
only where the subject matter of the procurement “is not subject to
193
exact specifications.”
Under this standard, then, the lowest
responsible bidder method should be used when the subject matter
of the procurement is capable of exact specification, and best value
used when the opposite holds true.
Ordinarily, the subject matter of a construction contract can
be exactly specified. Public bodies using lowest responsible bidder
methods have been doing this for years. Typically, the public
owner will contract with an architect or engineer to prepare
detailed drawings and specifications for the construction project
which define the quality of work, materials, and other “best” or
desired values required to be provided by the bidders. The bidding
contractors’ responsibility is to build and provide services strictly in
accordance with what is required in the drawings and specifications
and thus promise that the owner’s requirements for quality,
timeliness, and administration will be met. In such circumstances,
the owner is receiving exactly the “best values” it specified in the
drawings and specifications, and the only difference between
194
Thus, where the subject matter of the contract
bidders is price.
190. MINN. STAT. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1(a) (Supp. 2007).
191. See id. at subdiv. 1(b) (stating simply that “[t]he commissioner shall
determine whether to use” best value or lowest responsible bidder, but not
indicating how the commissioner should make the determination).
192. 234 Minn. 419, 49 N.W.2d 197 (1951).
193. Id. at 423, 49 N.W.2d at 201.
194. See Dean B. Thomson & Michael J. Kinzer, Best Value in State Construction
Contracting, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1999, at 31, 32 (“[I]f an owner wants the
better value of a longer life cycle for its equipment, a shorter construction
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can be precisely specified, the lowest responsible bidder method—
not the best value method—should be used.
The Legislature has already recognized the danger of a wrong
choice between the lowest responsible bidder and the best value
methods. In the statute that authorizes MnDOT to use the best
value, MnDOT’s ability to use the method is carefully limited to a
195
Of course, in
fraction of MnDOT’s design-build procurements.
design-build procurement, the design-builders, and not the public
owner, provide the architectural and engineering design services
(drawings and specifications) for the project in addition to the
labor, supplies, equipment, and materials. Design-build, then, is a
type of contract that is not based on fully defined specifications.
Permitting the best value method in design-build procurements is
consistent with the reasoning in Otter Tail Power Co., that factors
other than price might be considered if the subject matter cannot
be exactly specified.
It is not sufficient justification to use the best value method
simply because a component of the procurement might be difficult
to specify. For example, the public body might consider “public
relations” to be an important aspect of the construction contract to
196
be procured. If best value is to be used, perhaps proposers would
have an incentive to include far more public relations services than
the public body needs, so that they could receive a high best value
score. The result would be an award to the highest priced proposal
whose proposed final constructed product was no better than other
bidders’ final products. Most likely, the others bidders included
just enough public relationship services to satisfy the public body’s
needs. To avoid such results, a public body could exactly specify
and expressly require that contractors provide a certain number of
schedule, or higher quality material, then the owner’s design can specify these
‘value’ requirements in the bid package and the award will go to the lowest priced
bid. In this way the public is assured that its tax dollars will be spent to obtain the
desired or ‘best’ value for the lowest price.”).
195. MINN. STAT. § 161.3412 (Supp. 2007). See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing
limitations on MnDOT’s ability to use the best value method).
196. In MnDOT’s recent design-build solicitation to reconstruct the collapsed
I-35W bridge, MnDOT allocated fifteen out of 100 points to public relations.
MNDOT INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSERS, supra note 176, at ¶ 4.3.3.6. The result of
this best value approach was the award of the design-build project to a proposal
that cost approximately $57 million more and took seventy days longer to
construct than an alternative proposal. See Jim Foti, After the Collapse: Two Bidders
Feel Misled, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 21, 2007, at A1 (providing the finalist
proposers’ time-to-completion, estimated price, and technical and adjusted
scores).
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hours of public relations services, provide certain types of services,
provide a number of advertisements, notices, signs, and the like,
and use the lowest responsible bidder method.
A poorly made decision to use the best value method over the
lowest responsible bidder method presents a significant risk to
taxpayers that the public body will unnecessarily overspend. One
way to lessen this risk is to impose a requirement upon the public
body to first deliberate and then make a formal, detailed written
finding that the best value approach will best serve the public
interest. As mentioned in Part I.B.3 of this Article, MnDOT is
required to deliberate on no less than ten factors and make formal
findings before it can use the best value method for design-build
197
contracts. The administrative department commissioner and the
MnSCU Board of Trustees are also required to issue similar
findings before they can use design-build or CM at Risk best value
198
methods.
If these experienced public agencies and institutions
are required to deliberate and make findings before they use best
value procurement, no reason exists why smaller political
subdivisions, which may not have in-house expertise, should not
have to do the same. The 2007 best value statute should be
amended to require discussion of the appropriate procurement
method and issue comparable findings before the best value
method can be used.
D. Requirement of Responsiveness
Nothing in the new 2007 best value legislation overrides the
long-standing rule that a public body must reject proposals that are
199
“non-responsive” in some material respect. As discussed in Part I
of this article, a matter is “material” with respect to responsiveness
200
if it affects time, price, quality, or manner of performance.
Furthermore, a bid or proposal is non-responsive if the variance
gives the proposer a substantial benefit or advantage not enjoyed by
197. MINN. STAT. § 161.3414 subdiv. 2 (2006).
198. MINN. STAT. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(e) (2006).
199. Carl Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 451 N.W.2d 204, 208
(Minn. 1990); Foley Bros. v. Marshall, 266 Minn. 259, 263, 123 N.W.2d 387, 390
(1963); Duffy v. Vill. of Princeton, 240 Minn. 9, 12, 60 N.W.2d 27, 29 (1953);
Sutton v. City of St. Paul, 234 Minn. 263, 267, 48 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1951); Coller v.
City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 385, 26 N.W.2d 835, 840 (1947); LoveringJohnson, Inc. v. City of Prior Lake, 558 N.W.2d 499, 502–03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
200. Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 263, 123 N.W.2d at 390; Lovering-Johnson, 558
N.W.2d at 502.
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201

other competitors. The rule that non-responsive proposals must
be rejected ensures that the public receives all of the safeguards of
the public procurement process because all proposers will have an
202
equal opportunity to compete on the same basis.
When public
bodies award to proposers who do not compete on the same basis
as the other proposers (by including additional or excluding
required matters), a risk exists that the public body did not receive
the best value because the proposers were not competing on a level
playing field. Also, the public is protected from fraud and
favoritism because the public body is precluded from awarding the
contract to a competitor on a basis other than what is set forth in
the solicitation.
Two provisions in the 2007 best value legislation codify the
requirement of responsiveness into best value procurements. First,
the “criteria to be used to evaluate the proposals must be included
in the solicitation document and must be evaluated in an open and
203
competitive manner.”
Second, when the best value method is
used, “the solicitation document must state the relative weight of
price and other selection criteria,” and the “award must be made to
the vendor or contractor offering the best value applying the
204
weighted selection criteria.”
These two provisions require a public body to consider only
the criteria listed in the solicitation, and no other, and only in
accordance with their weights listed in the solicitation. The fact
that the evaluation must also be conducted in an open manner is
included to make it clear that a public body is prohibited from
awarding based on secret criteria, criteria developed after-the-fact,
or preferences that are not listed in the solicitation. If evaluation
must also be made in a competitive manner, all proposers are
entitled to compete on the same basis, which ensures that the
public benefits from a competitive best value process based on
materially responsive proposals.
E. Commentary on Listed Best Value Criteria
The new best value legislation gives a public body some
flexibility to identify the particular criteria that will be used to
201.
202.
(1954).
203.
204.

Lovering-Johnson, 558 N.W.2d at 502–03.
Griswold v. Ramsey County, 242 Minn. 529, 535, 65 N.W.2d 647, 652
MINN. STAT. § 16.03 subdiv. 3a (Supp. 2007).
§ 16C.28 subdiv. 1(c).
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evaluate proposals. Indeed, it permits the public body to consider
“the specifications of the request for proposal [and] the price and
performance criteria as set forth in section 16C.02, subdivision 4a,
205
and [as] described in the solicitation document.”
Although a
public body has discretion to determine appropriate factors and to
weight them in the solicitation document, a public body has no
discretion to consider factors other than the criteria listed in the
solicitation document or to weight the criteria differently during
206
the evaluation process.
In light of these rules, the public body
will want to carefully identify and weight the criteria by which
proposals are to be measured so that the formula actually yields the
best value for the public. Poorly selected criteria and weights could
result in challenges that the procurement process was arbitrary,
207
capricious, improvident, or extravagant.
Because section 16C.02, subdivision 4a, specifically identifies
nine “performance criteria” that “may” be used, public bodies
might be inclined to rely heavily upon them to structure the
solicitation documents. Regrettably, the nine performance criteria
identified are vague, redundant, difficult, if not impossible to
objectively evaluate, and not necessarily tailored to provide the best
value for the public. If they are to be used, the nine criteria should
be clarified to address the concerns discussed below.
The first listed criterion is “the quality of the vendor’s or
208
contractor’s performance on previous projects.” It is unclear how
“quality” is defined or how a public body can objectively assess
“quality”. For construction work, quality should be measured by
the degree to which the contractor’s work complies with the design
furnished and standards specified by the previous owner. If the
owner of a past project wanted the contractor to provide cheap
materials, and the contractor satisfied the owner’s requirements,
there should be no tally against the contractor on the quality
factor.
Certainly, the public body would need to perform thorough
data collection and research regarding the previous performance
of each proposer to obtain a complete and objective picture of the
quality of the contractor’s previous performance. Such a task
might require the contractor to list comparable projects completed
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at subdiv. 1(a)(2).
Id. at subdiv. 1(c).
See supra Part III.A.
MINN. STAT. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4a(1) (Supp. 2007).
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by the contractor and contact information for the owner. Then,
the public body would want to conduct recorded interviews of the
listed owners to see if the contractor’s performance met the public
body’s quality requirements.
In addition, the public body might conduct site inspections of
the contractor’s prior work. Visual inspections of a contractor’s
work may not be the best indicator of quality, however, if the
contractor’s work was in accordance with the contract and observed
flaws are related to the design or quality specification provided by
the previous owner, or insufficient maintenance. While collecting
the data necessary to properly evaluate quality may be burdensome
to a public body, a public body risks having an award overturned if
its analyses of the quality criterion are not based on substantial
209
objective evidence.
The second criterion is “the timeliness of the vendor’s or
210
It is important
contractor’s performance on previous projects.”
to note that delays are common in the construction industry and
trying to properly determine fault or responsibility for delays is no
211
small or easy task.
Certainly, a public body should want to have
its projects completed on time. Nevertheless, there are ways a
public body can protect itself from delays other than collecting and
analyzing substantial data to fairly evaluate the timeliness of a
contractor’s past performance. Usually, a public body protects
itself from delays attributable to the fault of the contractor by
including in the solicitation documents specified completion dates
and liquidated-damages provisions assessing damages against the
contractor for each day the project is late. Also, if the contract is to
provide a performance bond, the timeliness of the contractor’s
performance would be secured by a construction surety.
The third criterion is “the level of customer satisfaction with
212
the vendor’s or contractor’s performance on previous projects.”
Satisfaction is often determined by reference to a contractor’s
quality and timeliness, but if so, then this third criterion is
redundant of the first two. Clearly, a better definition of
“satisfaction” and better objective means to measure it is needed.
Customer satisfaction is also difficult to measure objectively
209. See supra Part III.A.
210. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4a(2).
211. For a sense of how complicated this issue can be, see the 357-page
discussion of construction delays in 5 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 22, at ch.
15.
212. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4a(3).
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because satisfaction is inherently subjective.
Thus, a good
contractor whose last job was successful could get a bad score if the
owner of the previous job was prone to complaints, understated in
his praise, or unreasonably demanding. It is possible that the
taxpayers will not receive the benefit of this good contractor’s
proposal simply because the contractor had the misfortune of
working in the past for an idiosyncratic customer.
The fourth criterion permits a public body to measure “the
vendor’s or contractor’s record of performing previous projects on
213
budget and ability to minimize cost overruns.”
It is hard to
understand the utility of this criterion. Most public contracts are
awarded on a lump-sum basis, which means that the contractor has
to perform the work for the quoted price. Thus, any “overruns”
will be the responsibility of the contractor; in other words, the
contractor will absorb its overruns and the project will always be
“on budget” unless the owner requests additional work to increase
the budget. Also, the public body’s budget in most circumstances
is established by the public body’s architect or engineer. Standard
agreements between owners and architects refer to budgets
prepared by the architect as “preliminary estimates” and architects
214
attempt to disclaim responsibility for them.
A contractor whose
bid exceeds the mistakenly low or preliminary budget of the public
body, engineer, or architect should not be penalized. After all, if a
previous owner did not like the contractor’s bid because it
exceeded the architect’s preliminary budget, the owner did not
have to accept the bid. Instead, the owner could have rejected all
bids and redesigned and rebid the project.
In addition, it is common in the construction industry for
public owners to ask the contractor to perform additional work,
and the contractor would be contractually entitled to additional
compensation for that work. Thus, there will be a “cost overrun,”
but it will be a cost overrun approved in advance by the public body
in a change order that modified the contract by the consent of
both parties. There should be no penalties assessed against a
proposer if the cost overrun in question was a change order
approved and signed by the owner. Even if the public body does
not agree to the contractor’s change order request, the public body
cannot hold an owner-driven cost overrun against a contractor
213. Id. at subdiv. 4a(4).
214. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT B141 ¶ 2.1.7 (1997), available at
http://www.designadvisor.org/pdfs/ b141.pdf.
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because public bodies are not to consider “the exercise or assertion
215
of a person’s legal rights” in the evaluation process, such as a
contractor’s request for additional compensation for additional
work ordered or caused by the owner.
The fifth criterion, “the vendor’s or contractor’s ability to
216
minimize change orders,” is also puzzling. A change order is a
contractual modification, and as such, must be agreed to by both
217
No reason exists to penalize a
the owner and the contractor.
contractor who performs extra work at the owner’s request. The
only way for a contractor to control such change orders is to refuse
the requests of the customer for additional work, which is usually
poor business practice and would result in a low customer
satisfaction score. Thus, it is conceivable that a contractor would
have to trade a future low score on customer satisfaction for a
future high score on minimization of change orders. This might
be a Hobson’s choice depending on whether the contractor’s next
bid is to a public body who might weight the factors differently
than anticipated by the contractor.
Alternatively, the contractor could decide to absorb without
charge the cost of owner-initiated change order requests so as to
avoid future low scores regarding change orders. However, if
contractors are forced to include contingencies in their prices to
cover the cost of possible owner changes, the benefits of
competitive bidding are lost because the system will result in
artificially inflated pricing. Certainly, the public does not receive
the best value from a proposal full of contingencies included to
cover possible owner requests for future change orders that may
never occur.
The sixth criterion is the “vendor’s or contractor’s ability to
218
prepare appropriate project plans.”
This criterion is vague in
that there is no definition of “project plans.” If project plans
means the detailed drawings and specifications for the project, the
criterion is irrelevant because the 2007 best value legislation does
not authorize design-build procurement in which the contractor is
responsible for preparing design drawings. Instead, the public
body is responsible for preparing the project plans for the

215.
216.
217.
218.

§ 16C.02 subdiv. 4a.
Id. at subdiv. 4a(5).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (8th ed. 2004).
§ 16C.02 subdiv. 4a(6).
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contractor and the contractor’s job is to build the work according
to the plans.
Alternatively, project plans could mean work methods. Again,
except in unique circumstances, a contractor’s work methods
should be largely irrelevant to a public body. The public body’s
main concern is receiving the end project that the public body
specified. Whether a contractor uses, for example, man-lifts or
scaffolds to accomplish the work should not be of concern to the
owner because the end result would be the same. It is also highly
doubtful that a public body without in-house expertise would have
any credible foundation or ability to evaluate a contractor’s
proposed means and methods for its work.
It may actually be against the public body’s best interest to
grade project plans because it may eliminate economic or useful
innovations. For example, if by using scaffolds instead of man-lifts,
contractor A is able to accomplish the work for half the price of
contractor B, the taxpaying public would be best served by hiring
contractor A. However, if contractor B receives a higher score on
the project plans criterion because the public body prefers manlifts, then contractor B might get the contract. In short, the
taxpaying public would be paying twice as much for the same work
simply because the public body, typically comprising lay people,
thought that man-lifts were a better work plan than scaffolds. If
contractors are to be graded on their work plans, they may be
reluctant to use newer and more efficient methods for fear of being
scored low on the project plans criterion; and the public will not
realize the best values from those newer methods.
The seventh criterion is the “vendor’s or contractor’s technical
219
capacities.”
This criterion seems to overlap the first, third, and
sixth criteria, each of which indirectly measure the contractor’s
technical capacities. Nevertheless, technical capacities could be
useful for the public body to evaluate—but only on the right
project. For example, if contractor A can achieve the required
work by using low-tech means for a lower price than contractor B
can achieve the work through high-tech means, the public would
be better served by going with contractor A. Going with contractor
B, simply because it scored higher on the technical capacity
criterion would be extravagant and improvident. Rather than

219.

Id. at subdiv. 4a(7).
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automatically employ this criterion, the public body should be
required to justify its use in written findings after due deliberation.
The eighth criterion is “the individual qualifications of the
220
contractor’s key personnel.” Certainly a public body would want
to hire contractors with experience in the subject matter of the
construction contract. One way of assuring that bidders are
sufficiently qualified is to use pre-qualification procedures to
narrow the pool of possible bidders. Once contractors are prequalified, the public body should be required to issue written
findings after due deliberation that there is further reason to
discriminate based on the experience or qualifications of a
contractor’s “key personnel.”
The ninth and final suggested criterion is “the vendor’s or
221
contractor’s ability to assess and minimize risks.” This can also be
a useful factor for a public body to consider. Nevertheless, it is
unclear from the statute exactly what risks contractors are to be
assessing or minimizing or how this ability is to be demonstrated to
and objectively measured and scored by a public body. In addition,
time, quality, and cost risks are already covered in the first, second,
third, fourth, and fifth criteria. The public body can protect itself
from other risks by requiring the contractor to provide insurance,
to agree to indemnity provisions, and to provide performance and
payment bonds.
Although “the vendor’s or contractor’s price” is not listed
within the nine specifically listed criteria, the statute requires a
222
public body to consider price in best value procurements.
Even
though the new legislation defines best value as the result of a
procurement method that considers specifically “price” and
“performance criteria,” it fails to mention how much relative weight
should be given to either consideration. This gap could lead to
arbitrary, capricious, or extravagant results. For example, the
public body could theoretically assign a one percent weight to price
and a ninety-nine percent weight to the fifth performance criteria,
“ability to minimize change orders.” The contractor with a high
price, yet a very good score in minimizing change orders, would
obtain the contract over a contractor with the reverse. If there are
220. Id. at subdiv. 4a(8).
221. Id. at subdiv. 4a(9).
222. See id. at subdiv. 4a (“‘[B]est value’ describes the result determined by a
procurement method that considers price and performance criteria . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
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no owner-driven change orders for the project, the public will have
paid a premium with no corresponding benefit. Moreover, with so
many subjective “best value” points determining which proposer
will be successful, the price of the proposal can become practically
irrelevant, which should never create the best value for the public.
223
Although the foregoing example is extreme, it is designed to
illustrate that the present legislation should provide more guidance
with regard to what extent price should be weighted. Other states
have specified at least a minimum price weight so that subjective
best value factors do not overwhelm and render irrelevant the price
224
component of the proposals.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article recommends that the Legislature immediately
amend its new 2007 best value legislation. First, the best value
method should be permitted only after a public comment period
and after deliberations and written findings are issued justifying its
use. Second, it should be made clear that non-responsive proposals
are to be rejected to protect the integrity of the competitive process
and to thwart subjective post hoc evaluation of bids. Third, the
concept of “openness” should be further defined to require
complete transparency in the procurement process. Fourth, price
should have a required minimum weight. Fifth, the “performance
criteria” should be revised so that they are reasonably tailored to
lead to a true evaluation of best value. Sixth, protest rights of
taxpayers and proposers need to be specifically recognized and
225
protected.
223. This hypothetical perhaps is no so theoretical in light of MnDOT’s
selection of the most expensive contractor with the longest schedule to rebuild the
collapsed I-35W bridge at a cost to the public of eighty-five million dollars more
than an alternative proposal. See supra notes 179, 195.
224. See, e.g., Thomson & Kinzer, supra note 193, at 32 (discussing then current
South Carolina law requiring price to be given no less than sixty percent weight).
225. These legislative suggestions are consistent with the MSBA Construction
Law Section Principles Re: Procurement Legislation, which the Section created and
adopted in 2001 and has since repeatedly reaffirmed. Salient provisions of those
principles include:
• Award criteria must be clearly identified, quantified, and weighted in the
solicitation, and award must be made pursuant to the stated criteria.
• Any procurement method and basis for award must avoid the
opportunity for favoritism, fraud, collusion, or improvidence.
• Allowed procurement methods should maximize competition.
• The public should have access to information throughout the
procurement process.
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With these changes, the legislation will more likely yield best
value results. Nevertheless, public bodies, taxpayers, proposers,
and courts will also have key roles in ensuring that the new
legislation will be implemented in a way that guarantees the most
responsible use of public funds. In the first instance, the public
bodies owe a duty to ensure that the taxpayers truly receive the best
value promised to them in this new legislation. At a minimum,
responsible public bodies must: (1) conduct best value
procurements in a completely transparent manner; (2) carefully
deliberate on the question of whether it is appropriate to use the
best value method instead of the lowest responsible bidder method;
(3) carefully select and weight appropriate criteria to measure
proposals; (4) ensure that the bids are measured in accordance
with the selected criteria and their listed weights, not on secret or
subjective factors; (5) reject bids that are non-responsive; and (6)
reject all bids if the product of the best value formula yields an
objectively improvident or extravagant contract.
Taxpayers and proposers must be active participants in the
procurement process. They must: (1) review proposed best value
criteria to determine if they are justified on their particular project
and demand that they be revised if they are not; (2) demand at all
times that proposers be allowed to compete on an equal playing
field; (3) demand access to the materials and rationales used by
public bodies to justify awards in best value procurements; and (4)
lodge complaints if those decisions are made in a fiscally
irresponsible, arbitrary, or capricious manner.
Courts also must meet the needs of the taxpayers by making
sure that the best value legislation is construed in a manner that
truly gives the taxpaying public the best value. Courts must ensure
•

In any negotiated procurement, the public agency shall not disclose,
prior to award, any bidders’ proprietary or confidential information such
as price or design solutions (no “technical leveling”).
• The agency should provide for a specific finding explaining why the
procurement method selected is preferable for the specific project and
how that method will maximize the public’s benefit as opposed to other
methods.
• Any responsibility, capability, or qualifications inquiry regarding a bidder
will not consider that bidder’s past assertions of claimed legal rights.
• Award to a successful protestor of its costs, including attorneys’ fees,
when acting as a private attorney general to uphold bidding laws.
See Letter from Dean B. Thomson, Chair of the Legislative Subcommittee of the
MSBA Construction Law Section to Renee Anderson, MSBA Main Office,
enclosing principles for 2005 (on file with the authors).
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that the strict protocols included in the new legislation are followed
by, among other things, voiding contracts awarded to nonresponsive bidders and guarding against possible fraud, favoritism,
or undue influence. Best value procurement requires the constant
vigilance of all participants to reach its promised potential or else
the 2007 legislation will not deliver “best value,” but only
disappointment, to the state’s taxpayers.
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